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Abstract 
An extensive amount of research has been conducted regarding the various 
advantages and disadvantages posed by engaging in market pioneering be-
havior at the product level. However, relatively little research examines fac-
tors that facilitate the relationship between a firm’s overall pioneering orien-
tation and firm growth. This article investigates pioneering as an orientation 
that a firm adopts in pursuing a proactive introduction of new products to the 
market across product lines. In doing so, this study examines organizational 
and industry factors that impact the relationship between pioneering orienta-
tion and firm growth and proposes that this main effect relationship will be 
curvilinear (inverted U shaped). Further, this study hypothesizes that an or-
ganization’s ability to strategically learn will positively moderate the relation-
ship between pioneering orientation and firm growth. Additionally, this study 
hypothesizes that the greater the technological sophistication of the industry, 
the more positive the relationship between pioneering orientation and firm 
growth. Hierarchical regression analysis was utilized to examine the hypothe-
ses as observed within a grouping of 101 select firms. Findings indicate that all  
hypotheses are supported, except for that regarding strategic learning, which 
is shown to negatively moderate the relationship between pioneering orienta-
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tion and firm growth. The authors conclude with a discussion of the findings 
and the potential implications of the study. 
Keywords: pioneering, pioneering orientation, strategic learning, entrepre-
neurial orientation  
Introduction 
Entrepreneurial behavior has become increasingly important to organizations as they face 
dynamic and complex environments (Barlett & Ghoshal, 1990) and seek new ways to in-
crease competitiveness (Covin & Miles, 1999). At the firm level, entrepreneurial behavior 
is manifested through an organization’s commitment to innovation, risk taking, and pro-
activeness (Miller, 1983). One of the ways in which an organization can engage in entre-
preneurial behavior is by becoming a pioneer in its market (Covin & Miles, 1999). An or-
ganization that engages in market pioneering is one that brings new products to market 
before other organizations do. Stated differently, market pioneering is “a particular form 
or manifestation of entrepreneurial behavior whereby the organization proactively cre-
ates or is among the first to enter a new product-market arena that others have not recog-
nized or actively sought to exploit” (Covin, Slevin, & Heeley, 2000: 177). An organization 
that consistently exhibits such market pioneering behaviors across product lines could be 
said to have adopted a “pioneering orientation.” Firms with a pioneering orientation are 
able to capitalize on potential first-mover advantages, which may help a firm create and 
sustain competitive advantage (Garrett, Covin, & Slevin, 2009). 
Several advantages to developing a pioneering orientation have been discussed in 
both the marketing and strategy literatures. For example, Robinson and Min (2002) dis-
cuss one of the potential benefits of becoming a market pioneer as being a short-term 
monopolist. This can allow the firm to create the industry standards by which future 
competitors are measured by consumers (Covin et al., 2000). Though monopoly ad-
vantages may not hold for long, pioneering organizations can nevertheless enjoy other 
advantages that can develop over time. For example, a pioneering organization may 
benefit from building brand loyalty, establishing switching costs, and preempting com-
petition by offering broad product lines (Kerin, Varadarajan, & Peterson, 1992; Lieber-
man & Montgomery, 1988). 
A pioneering orientation is not without its caveats. Lieberman and Montgomery 
(1988) stated that the disadvantages of being a first-mover are the advantages of being 
a late-mover. For example, late-moving firms can “free-ride” on the first-mover’s invest-
ments, enjoy the resolved technological and market uncertainty, and take advantage of 
the incumbent’s inertia (Robinson & Min, 2002). Furthermore, pioneers face significant 
amounts of uncertainty and bear a high risk of failure (Shepherd, 1999). 
Given the potential advantages and disadvantages associated with pioneering behav-
iors, it is unclear whether a pioneering orientation is generally “good” or “bad” for an or-
ganization. Indeed, “it is not clear whether either pioneering or following should gener-
ally be considered a normative strategic posture” (Covin et al., 2000: 177). Though there is 
an extensive amount of work that examines the relationship between order of entry and 
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various measures of performance, there is little work that empirically examines factors 
that moderate the relationship between a firm’s pioneering orientation and firm growth. 
Min, Kalwani, and Robinson (2006) recognize that the circumstances within which mar-
ket pioneers operate need to be explored to yield important insights into the factors that 
facilitate or attenuate the success of pioneering behaviors. 
Rather than exploring the pioneering acts of an organization from the individual-prod-
uct level, this article investigates pioneering as an overall orientation that a firm adopts in 
pursuing a proactive introduction of new products to the market across product lines. En-
trepreneurship research has often emphasized the status of a pioneer as being the literal 
first entrant into a given market (Lieberman & Montgomery, 1988), despite research such 
as Miller and Camp’s (1985) finding that both first and second entrants can achieve suc-
cess through early entry. This view is consistent with a number of studies that explore pi-
oneering behaviors as exhibited by a group of early leaders in a new market, rather than 
by de facto order of entry (Buzzell & Gale, 1987; Robinson & Fornell, 1985). Pioneering 
has been previously represented as a continuum ranging from follower-based actions to 
progressively more pioneering-based actions (Zahra, 1996a). This article joins with pre-
vious research by acknowledging the inherent difficulty in recognizing de facto pioneers 
(determined solely by market entry; Golder & Tellis, 1993) and answers a loud call for the 
utilization of new data and research methods in future explorations of market pioneering 
(e.g., Lieberman & Montgomery, 1988). That being said—and in view of the large number 
of more traditional “first entrant” pioneering studies—pioneering behavior may also be 
meaningfully explored from the perspective of a pioneering orientation, characterized as 
a repeated proclivity toward early unique product introduction. In essence, a pioneering 
orientation explores pioneering from a portfolio level where the firm is the level of analy-
sis, rather than investigating individual product pioneering efforts. Across product lines a 
firm can be variously pioneering, as a firm can be a pioneer in one product market but not 
in another. Explication of pioneering from a pioneering orientation perspective allows re-
searchers to explore the success of a firm resulting from an overall strategic posture of pi-
oneering across product markets. 
The concept of pioneering orientation shares noteworthy commonalities with other 
strategic orientations—namely, Miles and Snow’s (1978) concept of prospector firms 
and Porter’s (1980) concept of product differentiation strategies—yet pioneering orien-
tation is a distinct strategic orientation in several respects. Briefly, Miles and his col-
leagues use the label prospector to characterize firms whose “prime capability is that of 
finding and exploiting new product and market opportunities” (Miles, Snow, Meyer, 
& Coleman, 1978: 551). To the extent that the “new” product and market opportunities 
pursued by prospector firms represent opportunities that have not been previously ex-
plored by other firms (which is a possibility, according to how Miles and Snow describe 
prospectors, but not a requirement), then prospector firms are operating with a pioneer-
ing orientation. Nonetheless, prospectors need not be pioneers in an industry creation 
sense; they may simply pursue product and market opportunities that are new to them, 
that is, to the prospecting firms. Moreover, the concept of the prospector firm implies 
that a host of additional organizational-focused attributes exist for the firm (e.g., struc-
tural organicity), attributes that extend well beyond the characteristics of a pioneering 
orientation as this concept is herein employed. 
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Product differentiation strategies may also be consistent with a pioneering orientation, 
although this will not necessarily be the case. According to Porter (1980: 37), differentia-
tion strategies entail “creating something that is perceived industry-wide as being unique.” 
The basis for product uniqueness among firms with differentiation strategies could be 
any number of factors including, for example, outstanding product quality, superior ser-
vice, or strong brand identity. Significantly, the notion of the relative timing of market en-
try is not inherent to the concept of a product differentiation strategy. Thus, while firms 
with strong pioneering orientations compete on the basis of product lines that are dif-
ferentiated from those of their competitors, the observed basis of product differentiation 
among pioneering firms assumes a very specific form—one defined by the timing of the 
firm’s new product introductions. 
In sum, this study extends existing research on the pioneering–firm growth relation-
ship by specifically addressing the context and contingencies within which such a pio-
neering orientation can be most beneficial to a firm. In doing so, this study also distin-
guishes itself from the abundance of prior literature delving into various forms of the 
entrepreneurial orientation– firm performance relationship. Miller’s (1983) study is com-
monly credited as being the first to define entrepreneurial orientation as a multidimen-
sional construct encompassing a firm’s actions relating to proactiveness, innovation, and 
risk taking. Building on this theoretical foundation, and incorporating some scale items 
proposed by Khandwalla (1976/1977) and Miller and Friesen (1982), Covin and Slevin 
(1989) developed a nine-item measure they used to assess the strategic posture of a firm. 
This measure consisted of three items for each of the dimensions identified by Miller 
(1983). Covin and Slevin (1989: 79) theorized that the three dimensions of entrepreneurial 
orientation—proactiveness, innovation, and risk taking— together comprise a “basic, uni-
dimensional strategic orientation.” The Covin and Slevin measure has become the most 
commonly used measure of entrepreneurial orientation for empirical research (Rauch, 
Wiklund, Lumpkin, & Frese, 2009), and it is the measure used in the current study to 
control for entrepreneurial orientation’s effects on the relationships of interest, thereby 
empirically distinguishing pioneering orientation’s unique effects on performance from 
those of entrepreneurial orientation. 
While Lumpkin and Dess (1996) suggest that the concept of entrepreneurial orientation 
subsumes the range of pioneering behaviors, this article emphasizes and reveals pioneering 
orientation to be an organizational strategic behavior that uniquely explains variance in firm 
growth above and apart from an organization’s entrepreneurial orientation. Prior literature 
has emphasized pioneering as a specific exhibition of proactive behavior; however, proac-
tiveness encompasses a host of other behaviors as well and in doing so captures much more 
than simply market pioneering. The operationalization of proactiveness as a component of 
entrepreneurial orientation includes items designed to measure the initiation of competitive 
actions, the introduction of new products or services, administrative techniques, operating 
technologies, and so on, and the adoption of a competitive “undo-the-competitors” busi-
ness posture (Covin & Slevin, 1989). Amid this large array of strategic actions, the unique 
influence of pioneering behaviors upon firm performance can be lost among the commin-
gling of various proactive strategies. From an empirical perspective, focusing on pioneering 
as a distinct behavior set enables researchers to tease out important firm outcomes related 
to the introduction of new goods or services, which may be overlooked in a broader analy-
sis using proactiveness as a component of entrepreneurial orientation. 
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The purpose of this article is to investigate the relationship between a firm’s pioneer-
ing orientation and firm growth and to explore two potential moderating variables to this 
relationship: strategic learning and industry technological sophistication. The following 
section will introduce the research model, discuss the constructs involved, and expound 
the theory underlying the hypotheses. 
Theoretical Development and Hypotheses 
The Research Model 
The research model for this study adopts sales growth rate as the dependent variable. This 
particular dependent variable was chosen for a number of reasons. First, the estimates for 
sales growth are more readily available and reliable than profitability measures such as 
return on assets (ROA), return on investment (ROI), and so on, which are more prone 
to suffer from accounting measurement problems (He & Wong, 2004). Second, consis-
tent with a recent meta-analysis conducted by Rauch et al. (2009), relationships between 
a global entrepreneurial orientation measure (a construct theoretically linked to pioneer-
ing orientation) and measures of both firm growth and firm profitability have been found 
to be so similar as to make differences statistically insignificant. Third, survey-based sales 
growth rates have been found to achieve very high and significant correlations with ar-
chival-based sales growth rates (He & Wong, 2004). Finally, sales growth rate is regarded 
as an appropriate indicator of market pioneering performance, especially where a study 
focuses on firm-level performance rather than on product-level performance (Covin et al., 
2000). Other firm performance measures such as ROA and ROI are designed to primarily 
measure firm efficiency, whereas sales growth is a measure of firm effectiveness at creat-
ing and thriving in new markets. Thus, average sales growth rate appears an appropriate 
measure of firm pioneering performance. 
The independent variable in the model is pioneering orientation. For the purposes of 
this article, pioneering orientation represents a continuum of pioneering behaviors such 
that a high level of pioneering orientation indicates a firm operating with a heavy bias to-
ward early entry of uniquely innovative products into the market, while a low orienta-
tion indicates less of a reliance upon early entry as a business strategy as well as the in-
troduction of more incrementally new products. A firm’s degree of strategic learning and 
the level of industry technological sophistication were investigated as the two proposed 
moderating variables in this study. These two variables incorporate a mix of organiza-
tional and environmental factors that potentially facilitate the pioneering orientation–firm 
growth relationship. A more comprehensive theoretical rationale for each variable’s in-
clusion into our model is further discussed below. 
The pioneering literature has emphasized the importance of environmental context 
in determining the efficacy and necessity of engaging in pioneering behaviors (Golder & 
Tellis, 1993; Kerin et al., 1992; Zahra, 1996a). Past pioneering studies have explored envi-
ronmental differences related to growing versus mature markets (Buzzell & Gale, 1987), 
dynamic versus stable markets (Ali, 1994), and benign versus hostile environments (Kerin 
et al., 1992), but there is a relative dearth of research exploring pioneering as applied 
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within high- or low-tech industry contexts. The choice of industry sector is critical, as it 
determines the external environmental forces that will act upon the firm and to which the 
firm must adapt and respond with appropriate organizational strategies (Garnsey, 1998). 
Certain industry environments may be more advantageous than others to pioneering be-
haviors. For example, in environments flush with rapid change and short product life cy-
cles, future cash flows from existing operations are rife with uncertainty, and organiza-
tions may need to constantly seek out new opportunities in order to survive (Rauch et al., 
2009). 
Accordingly, one of the moderating variables explored in this study is the degree of 
technological sophistication associated with the pioneering firm’s industry environment. 
A technologically sophisticated environment is characterized by industry-wide heavy in-
vestments in research and development (R&D), frequent product and process technology 
changes, and heavy reliance on technical personnel as a basis for industry competitive ad-
vantages (Eisenhardt & Brown, 1998). These types of environments are associated with 
high levels of dynamism, a harbinger of elevated uncertainty that undermines the abil-
ity of managers to accurately forecast future events as well as their impact upon the orga-
nization (Khandwalla, 1977). Pioneering involves the exploration of resources and inno-
vation leading to new products and services. This type of opportunity-seeking behavior 
is more likely to prove successful in environments where the costs and risks incurred by 
exploration and experimentation are rewarded by capturing new product market niches 
(Lumpkin & Dess, 2001). The benefits accruing to pioneers may also be necessary to off-
set the threat of obsolescence, a condition heightened by dynamic and ever-changing en-
vironments (Miller & Friesen, 1983). Firms that confront technologically sophisticated en-
vironments may experience higher growth when they engage in pioneering activities. 
Lieberman and Montgomery (1998) postulate that it is the resources and capabilities 
of certain firms that enable them to achieve higher levels of pioneering success relative 
to their peers. From the perspective of the resource-based view, the decision regarding 
when to enter a new market would be based upon the strengths and weaknesses of a 
firm’s resource base, as well as upon the capabilities they can bring to bear. While re-
searchers have investigated various firm capabilities, including marketing skills, shared 
manufacturing abilities, and R&D competencies, prior to our study, strategic learning ca-
pabilities have yet to be empirically explored in terms of their impact upon the pioneer-
ing–performance relationship (Robinson, Fornell, & Sullivan, 1992). 
A firm’s ability to strategically learn has been theoretically linked to pioneering be-
haviors in the existing literature (Atuahene-Gima, Slater, & Olson, 2005; Baker & Sinkula, 
1999; Levinthal & March, 1993; March, 1991). Organizations involved in pioneering be-
haviors necessarily put themselves in the position of operating in environments and cir-
cumstances that can vary widely from previous experience. It is within these domains of 
uncertainty and ambiguity that an organization’s adaptive capabilities are critical, as the 
firm actively learns from potential missteps and takes corrective action to ensure future 
improved performance (Herriott, Levinthal, & March, 1985). In particular, strategic learn-
ing is the term commonly used in reference to learning behaviors and processes that en-
able long-run adaptive capability (e.g., Kuwada, 1998). Pioneering is essentially an ex-
periment with an unknown outcome; however, pioneers can arrive at a more positive 
outcome by utilizing learning processes to minimize mistakes and apply valuable experi-
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ence. Pioneering firms that show a capability for strategic learning may be able to lever-
age that capability into higher growth relative to firms without such capabilities. 
The Impact of Pioneering Orientation on Firm Growth 
As discussed earlier, the literature on market pioneering considers the many different ad-
vantages and disadvantages available to firms that pioneer. One study examined the sur-
vival rates of pioneering firms and found that they tend to survive longer than early fol-
lowers do (Robinson & Min, 2002). Pioneer survival rates were higher as a function of the 
length of lead time the pioneer had before other competitors entered the industry. How-
ever, the disadvantages posed by strong pioneering orientations are considerable. Indeed, 
being the first to enter a new market is like “an archer shooting at a target shrouded by a 
veil of fog” (Hamel & Prahalad, 1994: 238). Pioneering organizations face a great deal of 
market and technological uncertainty, for example, where the former arises from the diffi-
culty of forecasting customer response to the pioneer’s innovation, and the latter arises due 
to the uncertain success of the new first-generation technology (Robinson & Min, 2002). 
Keeping these various advantages and disadvantages in mind, it seems clear that 
“market pioneering is not a normative strategic behavior conducive to superior perfor-
mance for all firms” (Kerin et al., 1992: 48). Thus, an important question arises: Under 
what circumstances does a pioneering orientation lead to firm growth? This study investi-
gates potential moderators of the pioneering orientation–firm growth relationship. How-
ever, an additional point of inquiry for this article is the degree of pioneering best or most 
optimally exhibited by an organization. In essence, a firm’s pioneering orientation mea-
sures the degree to which it emphasizes pioneering behaviors across product lines, encap-
sulated by two dimensions— the level of firm reliance upon pioneering endeavors and 
the uniqueness associated with those pioneering initiatives. Firms with a high level of pi-
oneering orientation are those firms with a proclivity toward pioneering with uniquely 
innovative products. As such, is there a point of diminishing marginal return to empha-
sizing a pioneering orientation such that an organization can benefit from pioneering to 
a certain point, beyond which firm growth is diminished? We propose that organizations 
can largely benefit from pioneering, but developing overly high pioneering orientations 
will impede organizational growth. 
Min et al. (2006) explore this idea of degree of pioneering by investigating the var-
ious survival rates for pioneers and early followers engaging in what they call “really 
new” versus “incrementally new” products or innovations. According to Urban, Wein-
berg, and Hauser’s (1996: 47) description, “Really new products shift market structures, 
represent new technologies, require consumer learning, and induce behavior changes.” 
An incremental innovation, on the other hand, is designed to satisfy an identified market 
need and utilizes an existing technology or refinement of it. This is consistent with the ex-
tant literature’s categorization of innovation as ranging between the more incremental to 
the more radical in terms of the product’s newness to the company and marketplace (Ali, 
1994; McDermott & O’Connor, 2002). Min et al.’s conclusion from their study is that the 
market pioneer is much more likely to fail when it creates a new market with a really new 
product than when it creates a market with a more incremental innovation. Other empir-
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ical work (Golder & Tellis, 1993; Olleros, 1986) supports this idea of an inherently higher 
survival risk for pioneers of radical products compared to the materially lower survival 
risk for incremental innovators (Robinson & Min, 2002; Urban, Carter, Gaskin, & Mucha, 
1986). In other words, the degree of pioneering has a significant impact upon the success 
or failure of the pioneering initiative involved. 
Lieberman and Montgomery (1988) explore some of the reasons for this in recognizing 
that many of the disadvantages for pioneers of really new initiatives are actually advan-
tages for early followers. These disadvantages include free-rider effects, market and techno-
logical uncertainties, changing technology or customer needs, and incumbent inertia. These 
disadvantages are all exacerbated in extremely novel environments, whereas in incremen-
tally innovative markets they are more muted. For more radical products, followers have 
the advantage of observing evolving market and environmental forces and responding to 
take advantage of more certain and favorable dynamics. Due to the high levels of uncer-
tainty and evolving customer or technology dynamics, pioneers in such environments of-
ten miss out on the best opportunities, a situation that is difficult to fix retroactively as fac-
tors such as incumbent inertia and the purchase of certain fixed assets limit the flexibility 
available to an organization (Lieberman & Montgomery, 1988). Pioneering firm adaptations 
or corrective actions are also delayed by the allocation of firm attention away from critical 
environmental and competitive factors, which may be difficult to correctly identify as pi-
oneers mistakenly rely on experience originating from altogether different markets. More 
moderate pioneering ventures often retain the primary first-mover advantages while avoid-
ing the aforementioned disadvantages. In their study, Min et al. (2006) empirically show 
that, for market pioneers, the 12-year survival rates for pioneers of more radical products 
are drastically lower (23%) than that of pioneers in incremental product markets (61%). 
Thus, the challenges attributed to more radical product markets often outweigh the benefits 
of first-mover advantages. Such prior research seems to support the idea that a high degree 
of pioneering orientation is inimical to organizational survival. 
Another perspective on the dangers of utilizing a high degree of pioneering relates to 
the issue of firm balance and tension as tied to organizational initiatives of exploration 
and exploitation. Organizations that are actively engaging in the exploration process may 
not be involved in product exploitation to its most beneficial degree. Exploitation can be 
thought of as “the refinement and extension of existing competences, technologies, and 
paradigms” (March, 1991: 85), while exploration is “experimentation with new alterna-
tives” (March, 1991: 85). Organizations face a trade-off between where resources should 
be invested—that is, organizations must ask to what degree investment should occur in 
either exploration or exploitation, acknowledging that investing in one will take away 
from the other. As March (1991: 72) stated, “Choices must be made between gaining new 
information about alternatives and thus improving future returns . . . and using the infor-
mation currently available to improve present returns.” Organizations adopting strong 
pioneering orientations may be sacrificing present returns and growth gained through 
harvesting activities in exchange for unknown and uncertain future returns from high-
risk initiatives. 
Organizational ambidexterity has been identified in the literature as an organizational 
metaphor for firms that are equally dexterous at both exploratory and exploitative pro-
cesses. The importance of maintaining a balance between the two processes has been rec-
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ognized with near consensus, as scholars note that exploitation and exploration enable 
distinct, yet complementary, changes in firm performance through their differential in-
fluence upon the size, timing, and riskiness of firm cash flows (Levinthal & March, 1993). 
He and Wong (2004) provide empirical support for the importance of ambidexterity in a 
study showing that organizations that maintain a balance between exploratory and ex-
ploitative processes achieve higher rates of firm growth than those firms with an imbal-
ance between the two processes. Firms with elevated pioneering orientations rely upon 
pioneering endeavors across and throughout their multiple product lines, creating an im-
balance between exploratory and exploitative processes. This imbalance may lead to di-
minished firm growth. 
Given the growth potential presented by pioneering, but recognizing that there exist 
implicit dangers in engaging in pioneering beyond a certain degree, we posit that the re-
lationship between a firm’s pioneering orientation and firm growth is curvilinear. 
Hypothesis 1: The relationship between a firm’s pioneering orientation and firm growth 
is curvilinear (inverted U shaped), with optimal performance occurring when an in-
termediate level of pioneering orientation is exhibited. 
Strategic Learning as a Moderator 
Strategic learning involves the ability of firms to interpret the outcomes of past decisions 
and adjust future tactics based on what was learned from prior actions. Mintzberg (1991) 
depicted strategic learning as a process of continuously reformulating and crafting strat-
egies. Organizations that exhibit strategic learning continually “rethink” the nature of 
their business and strategic postures in response to feedback on the efficacy of past efforts 
(Leavy, 1998). In this article, strategic learning is defined as a firm’s ability to learn from the 
perceived efficacy of its business strategies or processes and change them when warranted. 
There is an abundance of prior literature explicating the role of strategic learning 
within organizations. This literature explores such topics as strategic learning’s relation-
ship with firm performance (Das & Elango, 1995; McKee, Varadarajan, & Pride, 1989; San-
chez, 1997; Shimizu & Hitt, 2004), organizational survival (Brittain, 1989), the evolution of 
firm capabilities (Dutton, Thomas, & Butler, 1984; Mody, 1989; Muth, 1986; Yelle, 1979), 
and a firm’s level of innovativeness (Baker & Sinkula, 1999). Collectively, the literature on 
the topic lends credence to the common observation that strategic learning represents a 
true source of sustained competitive advantage (De Geus, 1988; DiBella, 2001; Goh, 2003). 
Past research, however, has largely ignored the idea that the link between strategic 
learning and organizational performance may be strongly influenced by the context un-
der which that learning occurs. The context investigated by this article is that of the mar-
ket pioneer; this study explores how a firm’s strategic learning capabilities interact with 
the particular realities faced by pioneering firms. There are a number of reasons to believe 
that strategic learning would be particularly beneficial to a pioneering firm. Market pio-
neering is an exploratory behavior that forces an organization into an environment that 
is beyond the scope of its experience (March, 1991). In order to thrive in such an envi-
ronment, a firm must interpret and utilize new information in ways that reflect learning. 
For example, a firm must learn which of its prior practices it can retain, which it needs to 
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modify, and which it needs to discard. Because it is a foray into a relatively unknown en-
vironment, pioneering is essentially an experiment with an unknown outcome; however, 
it is an outcome that can be modified by a firm utilizing its strategic learning in order to 
minimize unproductive or harmful processes and strategies (Atuahene-Gima et al., 2005; 
Baker & Sinkula, 1999). Strategic learning would enable an organization to improve its re-
sponse to unknown or changing market conditions because it would enable the organiza-
tion to learn from past strategic actions and adapt current strategies midstream, thereby 
increasing the effectiveness of current actions and improving the likelihood of successful 
pioneering ventures (Stalk, Evans, & Shulman, 1992). Strategic learning also can enhance 
a firm’s ability to utilize market information for the purposes of product development 
and commercialization, improving its responsiveness to market demand and conditions 
(March, 1991; Levinthal & March, 1993). There are theoretical suggestions that strategic 
learning may be instrumental in increasing effective organizational responsiveness, a po-
tentially critical competency for pioneers (Atuahene-Gima et al., 2005). 
In short, the novel environment of the market pioneer magnifies the importance of 
strategic learning competencies, which may serve to enhance the pioneering orientation–
performance relationship. 
Hypothesis 2: The relationship between a firm’s pioneering orientation and firm growth 
is positively moderated by a firm’s strategic learning capabilities. 
Industry Technological Sophistication as a Moderator 
In numerous industries, organizations have used their technological prowess to create en-
during competitive advantages relative to their peers by adopting new processes, offer-
ing new products, redrawing industry boundaries, or revising the rules of competition 
(Utterback, 1994). These outcomes are especially crucial in industry environments where 
technological advances and utilization are commonplace and ever-shifting technological 
dynamics play key roles in determining new market leaders and benchmark technologies. 
Such industry environments are referred to in this article as technologically sophisticated. 
Technologically sophisticated industries are populated by firms competing in fast-
changing and unpredictable markets where the pace of product and process technol-
ogy change is a strong determinant of market leadership (Eisenhardt & Brown, 1998). In 
technologically sophisticated industries, pioneers have a number of first-mover advan-
tages that position them for success. First, in industries characterized by frequent prod-
uct change, the market will be accustomed to and gravitate toward the latest offerings. 
Past research indicates that the first product introduced in a market receives a dispropor-
tionate amount of attention in the consumer’s mind (Lieberman & Montgomery, 1988), 
has the greatest influence in determining customer preferences (Carpenter & Nakamoto, 
1989), more easily gains access to supplier shelves (Montgomery, 1975), and can estab-
lish enduring loyalty with early adopters (Schmalensee, 1982). Pioneers can, therefore, 
achieve enduring brand loyalties and successfully differentiate themselves from competi-
tors by being first-movers (Zahra, 1996b). Pioneers, because they are first to enter a given 
market space, may also be able to select the most attractive market niches and take strate-
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gic actions to limit the amount of remaining space available to support competing firms 
(Lieberman & Montgomery, 1988). The importance of rapid product development to firm 
success is well illustrated by Vesey’s (1991) study on high-technology products, which 
showed that when products were 6 months late entering the market, they earned 33% less 
than they would have if “on time.” 
Second, under conditions of rapid product change, a first-mover status is often neces-
sary to recoup product R&D costs by capturing attractive product market niches ahead 
of the competition. A pioneer’s proactive introduction of new products and services also 
helps attenuate the threat of eventual obsolescence, an imminent concern in dynamic mar-
kets (Lawrence & Lorsch, 1967; Miller & Friesen, 1983). Additionally, while the trajectory of 
technological process and product innovation is relatively uncertain, pioneers have an op-
portunity to impact the direction of industry technological growth by establishing an intro-
duced product or process technology as the de facto standard and, thereby, dictate the rules 
of competition (Zahra, 1996a). In so doing, first-movers can capitalize on R&D investments 
already aligned with future technology headings. While there are pitfalls to rapid product 
development and deployment, within the context of high-velocity, technologically sophisti-
cated industries, it appears first-market entrants generate sizable advantages. 
While it is often the case that market pioneers incur costs associated with their first-
mover status—including, for example, operating with limited knowledge of customer re-
quirements (Golder & Tellis, 1993)—our contention is that, on the whole, an industry envi-
ronment characterized by technological sophistication confers first-mover benefits to early 
entrants and penalizes latecomers. As such, technological sophistication would effectively 
moderate the relationship between a firm’s pioneering orientation and firm performance. 
Hypothesis 3: The relationship between a firm’s pioneering orientation and firm growth is 
positively moderated by industry technological sophistication. 
Method 
Sample and Data Collection 
The data for this research study were acquired through the partial sponsorship of the 
Southwestern Pennsylvania Industrial Resource Center (SPIRC), a regional economic 
development organization. Firm data were accumulated through the SPIRC’s census of 
businesses in the tri-state region (Pennsylvania, Ohio, and West Virginia) during the mid-
1990s. Prospective firms were narrowed down using selection criteria specifying that 
businesses be nondiversified business units (as classified by the SPIRC and verified by re-
spondents), operate on a manufacturing basis, and have 50 or more employees. This re-
sulted in a total of 418 candidate firms. Diversified firms were excluded from the sam-
ple in order to avoid confounding results with pioneering orientation philosophies that 
might differ across multiple businesses. The focus on manufacturing-based organizations 
effectively controlled for macroindustry effects by eliminating multiple and diverse in-
dustry sectors such as agriculture, mining, wholesale or retail trade, and so on, from the 
sample. The selection of firms employing only 50 or more people was made in order to 
avoid known size-related biases in the data. 
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In following with the procedure of Greer and Ireland (1992), two questionnaires, and 
self-addressed, stamped, return envelopes, were mailed to the senior-most executive of 
each of the 418 firms selected for the study as described above. This individual, consid-
ered the primary respondent, was asked to complete a questionnaire personally and to re-
fer the second questionnaire to another senior executive who would serve as a secondary 
respondent. The primary respondent was directed to select this second individual on the 
basis of that individual’s overall understanding of the business and level of involvement 
in the firm’s strategic processes. The secondary respondents’ data were used solely for 
measure corroboration and reliability purposes. Those firms that did not respond to the 
initial mailing were contacted 1 month later via telephone. 
Usable responses were received from 170 respondents, of which 115 were primary 
respondents and 55 were secondary respondents; this represents an organizational re-
sponse rate of 27.5% (115/418). This study utilized information from 101 firms, as only 
these firms had complete data available on all the study’s measures. The diversity of this 
final sample is reflected in the 74 different four-digit standard industrial classification 
(SIC) codes among the 101 firms, with no identical SIC code being represented by more 
than 6 firms. Sixty-three of the 101 firms were privately owned, while 38 were publicly 
owned. The average sales revenue and age of the firms in the sample were $134.23 million 
(SD = $440.38 million) and 48.63 years (SD = 31.12 years), respectively. The average num-
ber of employees among these firms was 805.60 (SD = 2,469.91). 
A power analysis was conducted to determine the sample size necessary to achieve 
the target power level of .80 proposed by Cohen (1992). Given a conventional significance 
criterion (a) of .05, an anticipated large effect size (based on the average values of R2 ob-
served in similar research), and 11 independent variables in our regression equation, a to-
tal sample size (N) of at least 81 is indicated for the current study (as computed based on 
a formula and effect size standards presented by Cohen, Cohen, West, & Aiken, 2003). 
Appropriately, the current sample size of 101 well exceeds this figure. 
The t-test comparisons of the average size (computed by both number of employ-
ees and annual sales) and age of the responding firms with the same data for nonre-
sponding firms (where available from secondary sources such as Ward’s Business Di-
rectory of U.S. Private and Public Companies) showed no significant differences (p >.10) 
between the two groups. Therefore, the study sample appears to be representative of 
the population at large in terms of size and age. The t-test comparisons of early re-
spondents (those firms that returned the questionnaires without second contact) and 
late respondents (those firms that replied after the second telephone contact) also re-
vealed no significant differences (p > .10) between the two groups in number of em-
ployees, annual sales revenue, firm age, or any of the other research variables of inter-
est to this study. 
Measures 
The next few paragraphs expand upon the various measures utilized in this research. Ta-
ble 1 illustrates the summary statistics (i.e., mean scores, standard deviations, and Cron-
bach’s alpha coefficients, where appropriate) as well as the correlation matrix. The ap-
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pendix presents the tests conducted to assess levels of internal response consistency—an 
indicator of construct validity for each of this study’s measures. 
The t-tests comparing the primary and secondary respondents’ mean scores across 
each research measure indicated no significant differences (p > .10) between the two re-
spondents. Thus, no discernible measurement bias exists within the sample as a function 
of who the respondent was within the firm. Overall, comparisons between secondary and 
primary respondents supported the treatment of the primary respondents as the key data 
informants for this study. 
Firm sales growth rate. This study operationalized firm performance as a firm’s sales 
growth rate relative to its industry. Sales growth rate was operationalized as the firm’s 
average rate of growth in sales revenue over its most recent 3-year period. The study 
employed a measure of sales growth that is relative to the industry growth rate to ac-
count for industry effects on the observed relationships. As discussed later in the Tests 
for Common Method Bias section, the self-reported sales revenue figures were corrobo-
rated where possible with secondary data (originating from the Harris Pennsylvania In-
dustrial Directory and Ward’s Business Directory of U.S. Private and Public Companies). To ac-
count for the differing growth rates of the industries represented in the sample, the 3-year 
average industry growth rate for each firm (as shown in the industry “value of product 
shipment” figures provided by the U.S. Department of Commerce) was subtracted from 
the firm’s 3-year average growth rate. This created an industry-controlled relative growth 
rate that was used as the dependent variable in this study. 
Pioneering orientation. This four-item, 7-point scale was developed by Covin et al. (2000) to 
measure the degree of a firm’s pioneering orientation. The items in this scale included the 
following: (1) We offer products that are very similar to those of our major competitors (re-
verse coded); (2) We offer products that are unique and distinctly different from those of our 
major competitors; (3) We compete heavily on the basis of being first-to-market with new 
products; and (4) We typically precede our major competitors in bringing new products to 
market. The pioneering orientation construct is thus consistent in reflecting the two primary 
elements of pioneering as espoused by the literature: market timing and distinctiveness (Car-
penter & Nakamoto, 1989; Golder & Tellis, 1993). A high score on this scale indicates a strong 
firm emphasis toward pioneering behaviors, that is, a high pioneering orientation. 
Strategic learning. This construct was measured using the six-item, 7-point scale pro-
posed by Garrett et al. (2009). The items composing this scale included the following: (1) 
My business unit is good at identifying strategies that haven’t worked; (2) My business 
unit is good at pinpointing why failed strategies haven’t worked; (3) My business unit is 
good at learning from its strategic/competitive mistakes; (4) My business unit regularly 
modifies its choice of business practices and competitive tactics to see what works and 
what doesn’t; (5) My business unit is good at changing its business strategy midstream 
as we get a sense of the likely effectiveness of our actions; and (6) We are good at rec-
ognizing alternative approaches to achieving our business unit’s objectives when it be-
comes clear that the initial approach won’t work. Higher average scores on this scale in-
dicate greater strategic learning. 
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Industry technological sophistication. This five-item, 7-point scale was developed by Covin, 
Slevin, and Heeley (2001). The items in this scale include the following: (1) Heavy invest-
ments in R&D are characteristic of my industry; (2) Frequent product technology changes 
are characteristic of my industry; (3) Frequent process technology changes are character-
istic of my industry; (4) Having superior technical personnel is a key basis for competitive 
advantage in my industry; and (5) The widespread employment of new or advanced pro-
cess or product technologies is characteristic of my industry. A higher score on this scale 
is indicative of greater industry technological sophistication. 
For the purpose of determining the structure of the data used to construct the multi-
item scales, the 15 items of the above measures were factor analyzed using principal com-
ponents analysis and a varimax rotation. Results indicated that the 15 items load (using 
a loading criterion of .50) on three separate factors corresponding to the theoretical struc-
ture of the scales. Moreover, no items loaded on more than one factor, and in all cases the 
items that loaded on a factor did so at a magnitude of at least twice that of the nonloading 
items. In short, the factor analysis suggested a very clean factor structure for the indepen-
dent variable scales. 
Control variables. Firm size, age, and ownership status (public or private) were controlled 
by this study because of expectations that the adoption of pioneering strategies and their 
associated outcomes might differ systematically with these variables (Teece, 1986). The 
measure of firm size used in this research is the respondent-reported number of employ-
ees. Firm age was assessed as the number of years the firm had been in business, also 
as reported by the respondents. Firm ownership status was measured as a dichotomous 
variable (1 = public, 0 = private). 
Entrepreneurial orientation was also employed as a control variable in this study 
in order to (1) distinguish this study from prior studies involving entrepreneurial ori-
entation and its effect upon firm growth (Covin, Green, & Slevin, 2006; Davidsson & 
Achtenhagen, 2005) and (2) partial out the unique contribution of a firm’s pioneering 
orientation to the determination of firm growth above and beyond that explained by en-
trepreneurial orientation. Pioneering behavior, or the lack thereof, is typically exhibited 
as a consistent strategic posture among nondiversified, single-industry firms, at least in 
the short to medium term (Bobrow & Shafer, 1987). Stated differently, most single-in-
dustry firms view themselves as exhibiting greater or lesser degrees of product mar-
ket leadership or followership in comparison to their industry rivals (Covin et al., 2000). 
This observation suggests an alternate perspective with which to operationalize pio-
neering, not as a nominal variable (e.g., literal order of entry into a new market) but as 
an overall strategic orientation toward pioneering— a pioneering orientation. This is 
similar to how other corporate entrepreneurship-related phenomena have been oper-
ationalized in empirical studies (e.g., Miller, 1983; Smart & Conant, 1994) and allows a 
firm’s overall pioneering posture to be plotted on a continuum ranging from a low re-
liance on pioneering as a business orientation to a high level of overall pioneering re-
liance. Firms exhibiting low levels of pioneering orientation are also characterized by 
their introduction of more incrementally new products, while firms high in pioneering 
orientation introduce more uniquely innovative products into the market. We believe 
the operationalization of market pioneering as an organizational orientation toward pi-
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oneering behaviors enables a unique analysis of the relationship between pioneering 
and firm performance. 
In this study, entrepreneurial orientation was measured by a nine-item, 7-point scale 
proposed by Covin and Slevin (1989), which contains some items adapted from Khand-
walla (1976/1977) and Miller and Friesen (1982). These nine items consist of three items 
designed to measure the innovativeness dimension of entrepreneurial orientation, three 
items to measure proactiveness, and three items to measure risk taking. A higher over-
all entrepreneurial orientation score is indicative of a greater entrepreneurial orientation, 
while lower scores indicate a more conservative orientation. 
Finally, the effects of environmental hostility on the relationships of interest in the cur-
rent study were also controlled for because prior research (Covin et al., 2000) has shown 
that a pioneering orientation operates in conjunction with environmental hostility as an 
influence on the relationship between firm growth and various competitive tactics. Envi-
ronmental hostility was measured by a six-item, 7-point scale developed and utilized by 
Covin et al. (2000). 
Analytical Techniques 
The hypotheses in this study were tested using two-tailed significance tests through hier-
archical regression analysis. Our five control measures (age, size, ownership status, envi-
ronmental hostility, and entrepreneurial orientation) were entered prior to other indepen-
dent variables in order to partial out their effects from the variables of interest. Natural 
logs were used for firm size and age in an attempt to normalize the distribution of these 
variables, as they were somewhat skewed. Our hypotheses were tested using a moder-
ated regression analysis technique recommended by Arnold (1982). The study’s analy-
sis of the proposed curvilinear relationship between pioneering orientation and firm 
growth proceeded by means of hierarchical regression, with the independent variable–
squared term following the independent variable in the regression analysis. If the results 
are found to be significant, this is taken as evidence of curvilinearity, with a positive co-
efficient of the squared term demonstrating a U-shaped relationship and a negative co-
efficient indicating an inverted U-shaped relationship. Pioneering orientation was mean 
centered prior to computation into a squared term in order to address multicollinearity 
concerns, as noted by Cronbach (1987) and Jaccard, Wan, and Turrisi (1990). 
To minimize correlations between the independent variables and their interaction 
terms, the independent variables were mean centered, as recommended by Aiken and 
West (1991), prior to the computations involving the interaction terms. The computed 
variance inflation factors (VIFs) associated with the measures were all well within the 
acceptable range of less than 10 (Hair, Anderson, Tatham, & Black, 1998); the highest 
VIF was 1.70. 
Tests for Common Method Bias 
To determine whether the usage of common data sources was resulting in method effects 
(see Podsakoff, MacKenzie, Lee, & Podsakoff, 2003, for a review of method effect tests), 
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two tests were conducted upon the data. The first test consisted of comparing data taken 
from the primary source (sales growth rate data) to corresponding data from a secondary 
source (sales growth rate data from public documents). Specifically, secondary sales data 
were available for 25 of the firms in the sample, and the correlation coefficient for the rela-
tionship between the firms’ actual, year-to-year sales figures and the self-reported 3-year 
average sales growth rates was r = .85. In those cases where secondary data were avail-
able, the primary and secondary numbers matched each other or were rounded approx-
imations of each other. The second test utilized a technique that looks for a latent meth-
ods factor to capture the effect of common methods variance on the correlations between 
the research variables. This technique is based on a form of confirmatory factor analy-
sis in which each survey item is allowed to load on both the theoretically intended con-
struct and the proposed common methods factor. The resulting correlations between the 
constructs can be compared to the nonadjusted zero-order correlations to determine if the 
magnitude of differences between the two suggests that common methods bias may be 
influencing the results. Both tests indicated that methods effects upon the data were likely 
to be minimal and not significant in influencing the analysis or results. (The average dif-
ference between the adjusted and nonadjusted correlations was 0.036.) 
Results 
Table 2 presents the regression analysis results. Model 1 incorporates the control vari-
ables plus the primary independent variable of pioneering orientation, but not its squared 
term. Models 2, 3, and 4 add the curvilinear effect variable (i.e., the pioneering orienta-
tion– squared term), the proposed moderators, and the interaction terms, respectively. 
As revealed in prior research (Covin et al., 2006), entrepreneurial orientation is posi-
tively associated with firm sales growth rate. The significant (p < .05) and negative b for 
the pioneering orientation–squared term shown in Model 2 is consistent with Hypothesis 
1, indicating a curvilinear relationship between pioneering orientation and sales growth. 
Because of the negative b, an inverted U relationship between the two variables is sup-
ported, indicating that both low and high levels of pioneering orientation have negative 
effects upon firm growth. Hypothesis 2 is not supported by the results, as Model 4 re-
veals a significant (p < .01) though negative b for the interaction between strategic learn-
ing and pioneering orientation. This indicates that strategic learning negatively moder-
ates the relationship between pioneering orientation and firm growth, in contradiction 
to our hypothesis. Finally, Hypothesis 3 is supported as Model 4 reveals a significant (p 
< .01) and positive interaction between a technologically sophisticated industry environ-
ment and pioneering orientation, affirming the belief that a pioneering strategy’s effec-
tiveness is supported by this type of environment. 
Discussion 
The main effect relationship found in this article warrants further discussion. This article 
posited that an overly strong pioneering orientation can be detrimental to firm growth. 
Pioneering orientation is operationalized in this study to reflect both the degree of new-
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ness or novelty in a pioneering pursuit and the overall proclivity of a firm to bring new 
products to market across product lines. Min et al. (2006) concluded in their study, which 
compared and contrasted pioneer survival rates for both “really new” and incrementally 
new products, that market pioneers are often the first to fail in really new environments 
while the first to succeed in incrementally new markets. The lower survival rate for firms 
pioneering really new products reflects the high degree of market and technological un-
certainty that confronts pioneers in extremely novel markets. In such novel environments, 
early followers have numerous advantages that allow them to leapfrog first-movers by 
virtue of their waiting until some degree of uncertainty has been resolved (Min et al., 
2006). While profitable for an early follower, really new product markets often spell the 
demise of first-movers. Studies such as that conducted by Min et al. (2006) are fueling a 
shift away from a historical preoccupation with discontinuities and radical, revolutionary 
innovation to the recognition that the true competitive advantage in pioneering environ-
ments may lie in the realm of incremental innovation and the myriad of benefits to be had 
in pushing existing technologies in new directions and refining them into streams of new 
products (Reich, 1987). 
The curvilinear relationship between pioneering orientation and firm growth as con-
structed from relevant study data is illustrated in Figure 1. 
This figure can be used to infer the average (industry-adjusted) sales growth rates of 
the sampled firms that exhibit particular levels of pioneering orientation. Specifically, 
Figure 1 suggests that the sampled firms are likely to grow more slowly than their in-
dustry averages if their pioneering orientation scores are at (approximately) 3.0 or be-
low on the 7-point scale. The firms with pioneering orientation scores in the low 4-point 
range (i.e., approximately 4.3) grow most rapidly relative to their industries, outpacing 
those firms with average pioneering orientation scores of 3.0 by about 3% per year. As 
the firms’ pioneering orientation scores increase beyond the low 4-point range, their in-
dustry-adjusted sales growth rates decline. For example, the firms with scores of 6.0 on 
Figure 1. Pioneer Orientation–Sales Growth Relationship
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the pioneering orientation scale grew more slowly than their industries by about 1% per 
year, and the most pioneering-oriented firms in the sample were outperformed by their 
industries, on average, by nearly 7% per year.   
The somewhat surprising result of our study was that Hypothesis 2 was unsupported. 
In fact, strategic learning was shown to negatively, rather than positively, moderate the 
pioneering orientation–performance relationship. This finding is rather counterintui-
tive when compared to the wealth of literature that indicates that strategic learning and 
firm performance are positively linked. Past research has revealed that learning can ben-
efit firms by decreasing manufacturing costs (Leavy, 1998), promoting successful diver-
sification (Porter, 1987), enabling innovation (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990), and facilitating 
sustainable competitive advantages (Schroeder & Robinson, 1991). Generally speaking, 
strategic learning appears to hold numerous benefits for firms; however, when applied 
within the specific context of the market pioneer, there are a number of possible explana-
tions for the observed negative moderation effect. 
First, strategic learning does not always increase an organization’s effectiveness, or 
even its potential effectiveness, as what a firm learns in one environment may be irrel-
evant when that knowledge is applied in a different environment. That is, operating in 
a new or uncertain environment may result in findings that overturn what was “known 
to be true” based on prior learning. Learning per se does not produce positive organiza-
tional results when such learning is mistakenly applied in environments within which 
its lessons no longer hold true (Huber, 1991). The misapplication of previous experience 
has been explained by core rigidities and competency traps (Leonard-Barton, 1992; Lev-
itt & March, 1988). Specifically, as an organization learns more about a specialized rou-
tine and achieves favorable performance, it becomes increasingly blind to alternatives 
that might be superior. Further, primacy effects (Michael & Palandjian, 2004), the over-
weighting of earlier experiences relative to later ones, and the reliance on these expe-
riences in dictating firm action, could become increasingly prevalent. Utilizing previ-
ously acquired knowledge can be particularly disastrous when a firm’s market context 
is being newly experienced. 
Research suggests that the relative predictability of stable environments can promote 
and extend the usefulness of strategic lessons, making these lessons relevant across lon-
ger periods of time (Lant & Mezias, 1990). This is because the familiarity of a firm with sa-
lient aspects of its operating environment is a critical component leading to the effective 
application of strategic learning. In contrast, pioneering firms operate in novel domains 
where prior learning may have greatly discounted value or even prove detrimental to the 
firm when acted upon. As observed by Levitt and March (1988), pioneering firms operate 
in unfamiliar environments, accentuating a “sample representativeness” problem where 
situational learning occurs within a context different from that where it is applied. Un-
relenting pioneering behavior often leads to random strategic drift rather than to orga-
nizational improvement. Moreover, learning in novel environments is inherently more 
difficult than learning in known environments. Pioneering firms face high levels of envi-
ronmental ambiguity, making it difficult to differentiate valid signals from noise (Lant & 
Mezias, 1990). Such ambiguous stimuli can lead to an understanding of the environment 
that is more influenced by prior learning and perception rather than by the stimuli itself 
(Huber, 1991). Consequently, pioneering firms may have a tendency to utilize irrelevant 
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lessons from the past when confronted with new and uncertain environments, leading to 
unsatisfactory organizational outcomes. 
Another connected explanation for the negative moderating effect of strategic learning 
on a pioneering firm’s performance relates to the concept of dominant logic. Organiza-
tional members carry with them mental models of deeply ingrained assumptions, gener-
alizations, and understandings or perceptions of the world that are called their “dom-
inant logics” (Leavy, 1998). These mental models are composed primarily of the tacit 
knowledge individuals use to make quick decisions or responses. An individual’s domi-
nant logic helps shape the information that is received such that, oftentimes, the interpre-
tation of stimuli is determined more by what is “in” the mind of the individual than by 
what is “in” the stimuli (Bruner, 1957). To make effective use of novel information, indi-
viduals need to unlearn prior mental assumptions and connections in order to act or per-
ceive things in a different manner than that which their prior experience dictates (Huber, 
1991). 
Unfortunately, there is a built-in limit to the diversity of information an individual can 
correctly interpret based on the various cognitive maps he or she uses to manage that in-
formation (Prahalad & Bettis, 1986). Herein lies the problem for a pioneering firm. The 
managers of pioneering firms are faced with the challenge of continually adapting, mod-
ifying, and unlearning their respective dominant logics in an effort to assimilate new per-
ceptions and interpretations of incoming information. At some level, this learning process 
may entail costs to organizational performance, as prior mental maps lead to erroneous 
decisions during the process of new experiential feedback and assimilation. 
In short, there is evidence in the literature and existing theory for our unanticipated 
finding that strategic learning negatively moderates the relationship between pioneering 
orientation and performance. In particular, our findings are consistent with the results of 
a recent study by Michael and Palandjian (2004), which found that in new product intro-
ductions, organizations find it harder to learn from experience as experience grows. Their 
study and our own results suggest that strategic learning, while not in and of itself detri-
mental to the firm, may be grounded in past experience in environments that are no lon-
ger representative of the operating environment of the firm. The exhibition of strategic 
learning in such cases may result in unsatisfactory firm outcomes where prior learning is 
unconnected with present environmental dynamics. The negative moderation of the pio-
neering orientation–firm growth relationship by strategic learning is illustrated in Figure 
2 and corroborated through the subgroup analysis shown in Table 3. Of particular note, 
as suggested by Table 3, a pioneering orientation may be most predictive of sales growth 
rate among firms with low strategic learning scores. As such, a pioneering orientation 
may benefit firms most when current pioneering efforts are directed by real-time infor-
mation rather than by knowledge derived from potentially irrelevant or misleading past 
strategic lessons. 
The hypothesized positive moderation of the relationship between pioneering orienta-
tion and firm growth by a technologically sophisticated industry environment was sup-
ported in our analysis. In high-tech industry environments, first-mover advantages are 
enhanced by the market dynamism and frequent product or process technology changes 
that lend themselves to brief periods of product exploitation. Fleeting windows of mar-
ket opportunity may be completely missed by later entrants. The positive moderation of 
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the pioneering orientation–firm growth relationship by industry technological sophistica-
tion is graphically depicted in Figure 3 and corroborated through the subgroup analysis 
shown in Table 4. 
Finally, an important finding from this study concerns the explication of and sup-
port for pioneering orientation as a distinctly different construct from entrepreneurial 
orientation. Prior to this study, entrepreneurial orientation was commonly viewed as 
subsuming market pioneering behaviors through its innovativeness, risk-taking, and, 
Figure 2. Effect of Strategic Learning on the Pioneering Orientation–Firm Growth Relationship     
Table 3. Subgroup Analysis Reflecting the Interaction of Strategic Learning (SL) and Pioneering 
Orientation (PO)
 Average sales growth rate = 0.796 Average sales growth rate = –0.876
High SL Standard deviation = 14.325 Standard deviation = 13.861
 Number of observations = 21 Number of observations = 25
 Average sales growth rate = –3.668 Average sales growth rate = 2.601
Low SL Standard deviation = 16.951 Standard deviation = 12.961
 Number of observations = 34 Number of observations = 21
                     Low PO                      High PO
Median splits on variables representing the x and y axes were used to create the quadrants.
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particularly, proactiveness dimensions (Lumpkin & Dess, 1996). Somewhat counterin-
tuitively, however, this study revealed highly significant pioneering orientation interac-
tions with strategic learning and industry technological sophistication after the effects 
of entrepreneurial orientation had been partialed out of the relationships in question. 
Thus, pioneering behaviors appear to have significant effects upon firm performance 
above and beyond those explained by a firm’s entrepreneurial orientation. Rather than 
functioning as a subdimension of entrepreneurial orientation, a firm’s pioneering ori-
Figure 3. Effect of Industry Technological Sophistication on the Pioneering Orientation–Firm 
Growth Relationship   
Table 4. Subgroup Analysis Reflecting the Interaction of Industry Technological Sophistication (TS) 
and Pioneering Orientation (PO)
 Average sales growth rate = –4.735 Number of observations = 22
High TS Standard deviation = 18.302 Average sales growth rate = 1.804
 Number of observations = 29 Standard deviation = 14.376
 Average sales growth rate = 1.127 Average sales growth rate = –.291
Low TS Standard deviation = 12.639 Standard deviation = 12.715
 Number of observations = 26 Number of observations = 24
                     Low PO                      High PO
Median splits on variables representing the x and y axes were used to create the quadrants.
1540 M u e l l e r ,  T i T u s ,  C o v i n ,  & s l e v i n  i n  J o u r n a l  o f  M a n a g e M e n t  38 (2012) 
entation has independent effects on firm growth, which suggests the need to treat en-
trepreneurial orientation and pioneering orientation as separate constructs for theory-
building and theory-testing purposes.  
A more incisive look at the items comprising the entrepreneurial orientation and pio-
neering orientation scales helps to distinguish the theoretical rationale undergirding the 
differences between the two constructs. As presented in the introduction, a firm’s entre-
preneurial orientation is reflected by a scale measuring items related to proactiveness, 
innovativeness, and risk taking. As such, entrepreneurial orientation represents an over-
all strategic orientation of a firm that can be implemented through a number of distinct 
behavior sets. For example, the scale items designed to measure firm proactiveness en-
compass various firm behaviors including the introduction of new products or services, 
administrative techniques, operating technologies, and so on. The scale items compris-
ing the dimension of risk taking measure a firm’s proclivity toward bold, aggressive ac-
tion and investment in high-risk projects. These measures are deliberately broad and 
summate to form an overall strategic posture capable of being reflected in a wide range 
of distinct behaviors. 
Pioneering behaviors are one such specific enactment of an entrepreneurial orienta-
tion. Importantly, however, firms with similar levels of an entrepreneurial orientation 
may have their entrepreneurial postures enacted in markedly different fashions, result-
ing in disparate impacts upon firm performance and growth. The construct of pioneering 
orientation measures a specific implementation of a firm’s entrepreneurial orientation, 
that of pioneering behaviors. Moreover, while the entrepreneurial orientation dimension 
of proactiveness is consistent with the exhibition of market pioneering, this dimension 
is also consistent with other preemptive or “early-mover” behaviors (e.g., implementing 
new administrative techniques, incorporating new operating technologies). This study 
suggests that the effects on performance of a firm’s pioneering orientation will not be 
fully captured by examining its entrepreneurial orientation. Given the high level of inter-
est and extensive empirical literature surrounding the study of both entrepreneurial ori-
entation (Rauch et al., 2009) and pioneering (Gorecki, 1986; Lambkin, 1988, 1992; Lilien & 
Yoon, 1990; Miller, Gartner, & Wilson, 1989; Mitchell, 1991; Robinson, 1988; Robinson & 
Fornell, 1985), evidence that pioneering orientation explains additional variance in per-
formance outcomes above and beyond that of entrepreneurial orientation is significant 
and useful for demonstrating the appropriateness of having separate research streams. 
Limitations 
There are several limitations to our study. First, this study is based on cross-sectional sur-
vey data, which by nature is unable to establish the existence of causal relationships. Re-
search indicates that poorly performing organizations may be more likely to engage in 
bold solutions (Ketchen & Palmer, 1999); that is, poorly performing organizations may ex-
hibit pioneering behavior to a greater degree as an attempt to revive performance. Should 
this be the case, it may account for some of the diminished relationship between pioneer-
ing orientation and firm growth found at the higher end of the pioneering spectrum. 
Second, the study relied largely upon self-report data for key research variables. While 
measures of these variables correlated as expected with theoretically relevant constructs, 
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per tests of internal response consistency, the measures could not be corroborated via rel-
evant secondary data, as none were available. Self-report data can fall prey to social desir-
ability and percept–percept biases. 
Third, as a qualification to the empirical results, while the data confirmed the existence 
of a curvilinear relationship between pioneering orientation and firm sales growth rate, the 
identified inverted U–shaped relationship is not particularly dramatic. That is, while firms 
operating with moderate pioneering orientations outperform those firms with very high 
and very low pioneering orientations, the absolute size of this performance effect is modest. 
By contrast, the absolute size of the performance effects revealed through the interactions 
between pioneering orientation and both industry technological sophistication and strate-
gic learning are relatively substantial by strategic management research standards (see Mi-
sangyi, Elms, Greckhamer, & Lepine, 2006). As such, the true “story” revealed by the data is 
principally one about the importance of context to pioneering success. 
Finally, the dependent variable chosen for this study—firm sales growth rate—while 
appropriate as an indicator of a firm’s overall success in pursuing a market pioneering 
strategy does not imply anything about a firm’s efficiency at generating profits from op-
erations. Growth and profitability—corresponding to a firm’s effectiveness versus its ef-
ficiency (Venkatraman & Ramanujam, 1986)—are two distinctly different dimensions of 
firm performance (see Murphy, Trailer, & Hill, 1996). That being said, the results of this 
study may not have held if a profitability measure had been chosen as the dependent 
variable. 
Implications 
There are several important implications to this study. First, firms need to carefully con-
sider the benefits and risks imposed upon market pioneers before acting. Firms’ deci-
sions to enter novel markets need to be tempered by an understanding of the associated 
technological and market uncertainties and the rapid adaptive capability such environ-
ments demand. In some industry environments, under certain conditions, it makes more 
sense to adopt an early-follower stance in order to appropriate value from an innovation 
or novel product (Min et al., 2006). Firm managers need to ask themselves a series of key 
questions prior to deciding if and when to move into new markets, such as: Do they have 
the protection of a strong appropriability regime? Can they protect their product or pro-
cess from imitation long enough to provide a buffer of lead time and experience in order 
to carve out a proper niche? Is the market or technological uncertainty surrounding the 
product market so great as to unduly increase their incumbent risks? Might it be better to 
analyze others’ forays into the market and capitalize on their mistakes while waiting for 
certain market uncertainties to be resolved? 
Second, the discovery of a curvilinear relationship between pioneering orientation and 
firm performance suggests that finding the right balance in terms of product novelty (de-
gree of newness) and in a firm’s overall reliance upon pioneering strategies across prod-
uct lines is a critical factor in determining the resulting success of the pioneering initia-
tives. Past studies indicate that the strength of market pioneers exists in incrementally 
new product markets rather than in overly novel domains (Min et al., 2006). Organiza-
tions tempted to enter into completely new product markets might want to reconsider the 
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brashness of that decision in light of all the evidence indicating that early-follower tactics 
are often more successful in such environments (e.g., Lieberman & Montgomery, 1988; 
Robinson & Min, 2002; Urban et al., 1986). The uncertainty implicit to such novel domains 
recommends a wait-and-see mentality with which to better define and understand the na-
ture of the market. 
Third, firms need to be more aware of and intentional in directing their R&D initia-
tives toward innovations or discoveries that can be more readily protected. In explicating 
the positive moderation of the pioneering orientation–firm growth relationship via indus-
try technological sophistication, this study emphasizes the pioneering benefits of operat-
ing within environments characterized by heavy investments in R&D and frequent prod-
uct and process technology changes. While this study did not directly address the idea of 
appropriability regimes and strategies that pioneers can use to secure and protect intellec-
tual property rights within technologically sophisticated environments, this study reveals 
the importance to the pioneer of innovating within industry environments amenable to 
appropriation. An innovator can improve the effectiveness of its investments in R&D by 
adjusting its portfolio to maximize the probability that technological discoveries will de-
velop that either are easy to protect via intellectual property law or require for commer-
cialization certain competencies or co-specialized assets already within the firm’s reper-
toire (Lieberman & Montgomery, 1988). R&D investment decisions cannot be divorced 
from the strategic analysis of markets and industries, nor from the calculation of the types 
of innovations from which value will most likely be appropriated. Prior to a pioneering 
decision, firms can take actions that increase the likelihood that first- or early-mover ad-
vantages will be realized, such as pursuing patents, focusing on lead time and learning 
curve advantages during the monopoly period, and securing key finite resources (e.g., re-
tailing locations or distribution networks; Lieberman & Montgomery, 1988; Teece, 1986). 
Finally, when entering novel environments firms need to guard against mistakenly 
applying knowledge accumulated in prior contexts. Inferences that managers make re-
garding past strategic action–outcome relationships may not remain accurate or valid in 
new environments. Pioneering firms may need to reevaluate their prior learning along 
with many of the routines and practices they have developed to codify this knowledge. 
Results of the current research indicate that when firms enter new and uncertain envi-
ronments, they might be well advised to utilize a learning-by-analysis approach over a 
learning-by-doing approach to strategic learning. In a learning-by-doing approach, firms 
seek out applicable knowledge within their operating environments by taking action and 
then analyzing the results. Significantly, these actions are often informed by prior experi-
ence in different environments where the factors of success may bear no relation to those 
governing the pioneering environment (Sorenson, 2003). By contrast, a more conservative 
learning-by-analysis approach can reduce the uncertainty inherent to the pioneering do-
main through extensive data collection and analysis prior to taking strategic action. While 
it is true that “learning your way in” will sometimes be the only way for firms to under-
stand the strategic requirements of novel operating environments (McGrath, Keil, & Tuki-
ainen, 2006), utilizing a learning-by-analysis approach can enable firms to validate the 
accuracy of their prior assumptions, thereby lessoning the likelihood that avoidable stra-
tegic missteps will occur. 
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Future Research 
Future research topics might consider further the issue of market entry timing. Under 
what circumstances and in which types of market environments are first-mover, early-fol-
lower, and slow-follower strategies most predictive of success (Min et al., 2006)? Another 
perspective on this might delve into how particular characteristics and competencies of 
firms—such as the firm’s past pioneering experiences or the diversity of the product mar-
kets in which the firm operates—affect the level of performance associated with the pur-
suit of a market pioneering strategy (Lieberman & Montgomery, 1988). 
The time period during which strategic learning takes place is a variable that might 
be fruitfully explored in future research. Questions such as how organizations can has-
ten their speed of learning and the associated benefits and risks of such a capability have 
yet to be materially addressed. The learning research stream is moving toward contin-
gency and context-based analysis of learning capabilities and their effect upon firm per-
formance. The current study also prompts questions regarding the usefulness of prior 
learning in novel domains. How do organizations minimize the misapplication of past ex-
perience and accelerate the process of strategic learning when entering new markets? In 
general, novel environments such as those explored by market pioneers offer a rich back-
drop in which to explore the benefits of strategic learning. 
Finally, the curvilinear nature of the relationship between pioneering orientation and 
firm performance suggests a number of opportunities for further investigation. The con-
tour of this curve is no doubt dependent on the degree of novelty of the markets entered 
and the speed with which pioneering firms learn as they navigate their novel domains. 
Are there other characteristics that are particularly promising as facilitators of success 
among firms that choose to enter unfamiliar environments? An organizational response 
capability is one such characteristic suggested for examination. The attributes of the new 
markets being entered may also affect whether these novel domains represent congenial 
or hostile contexts for the pioneering firm. As noted previously, tight appropriability re-
gimes can enable pioneering firms to capture the value created through their market ac-
tions (Teece, 1986). Research should investigate the possible impact of other factors inher-
ent to or associated with markets—such as information diffusion rates and the structure 
of customer networks and alliances—as factors that determine the shape of the pioneer-
ing–performance relationship. 
Conclusion 
Pioneering behaviors can function as a double-edged sword, variously serving to en-
able firm growth and threaten firm survival. This study extends the knowledge frontier 
by positing and empirically confirming the importance of strategic learning and indus-
try technological sophistication as factors moderating the pioneering orientation–firm 
growth rate relationship. Additionally, this study demonstrates the curvilinear nature 
of the pioneering orientation–firm growth relationship, highlighting the dangers of both 
very high and very low pioneering orientations. In closing, Olleros (1986: 8) commented 
on the inherent risk of pioneering, by stating, “Again and again, we see industries emerge 
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over the dead bodies of their early pioneers.” Thus, it seems crucial, both in theory and 
in practice, to continue exploring those factors that explain the performance outcomes re-
alized by firms that embrace a pioneering orientation. This research is offered as another 
step toward this important end. 
Appendix 
Tests of Measurement Validity 
As a more direct test of the validity of this study’s measures, tests of internal response consistency 
for the key research variables were performed. The internal response consistency of this study’s 
measures was assessed by concurrently collecting data using scales expected to correlate with these 
measures. Moderate-to-high internal response consistency can be interpreted as suggesting the 
presence of convergent validity for measures (Bagozzi, Tybout, Craig, & Sternthal, 1979). 
Pioneering orientation scale. Internal response consistency was assessed by examining this scale’s 
correlation with a scale composed of items intended to measure proactiveness, as taken from the 
larger, nine-item entrepreneurial orientation scale proposed by Covin and Slevin (1989). The proac-
tiveness-related items of the entrepreneurial orientation scale are replicated as follows: 
In dealing with its competitors, my business unit . . . 
Typically responds to actions that  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  Typically initiates actions to 
competitors initiate   which competitors then respond 
Is very seldom the first business  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  Is very often the first business 
to introduce new products/   to introduce new products/ 
services, administrative   services administrative 
techniques, operating   techniques, operating 
technologies, etc.   technologies, etc. 
Typically seeks to avoid  1  2  3  4  5  6 7  Typically adopts a very 
competitive clashes, preferring   competitive, “undo-the-
a “live-and-let live” posture   competitors” posture 
As argued by Cahill (1996), entrepreneurial orientation and market pioneering are very similar 
constructs, with both constructs implying the exhibition of proactive behavior. Lumpkin and Dess 
(1996: 606) further specify that “the concept of entrepreneurial orientation contains the idea of pi-
oneering.” As such, the pioneering orientation scale was expected to correlate positively with the 
proactiveness- related items from Covin and Slevin’s (1989) overall entrepreneurial orientation 
measure. In the current database, the proactiveness-related items were combined to form a scale 
with a reliability of a = .69. As anticipated, the pioneering orientation and proactiveness scales are 
positively and significantly correlated (r = .50, p < .01). 
Strategic learning scale. Internal response consistency was assessed by examining this scale’s correla-
tion with a measure of strategic control. Research by Lant, Milliken, and Batra (1992) suggests that 
strategic learning occurs as firms recognize the need to alter their strategies and that recognition of 
the need for strategic change is typically prompted by the exercise of strategic control. As such, a 
positive and significant correlation was expected between the strategic learning scale and a strate-
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gic control scale developed expressly for this research (a = .87). Specifically, strategic control was as-
sessed using a 7-point scale where the respondent was asked to indicate his or her level of agree-
ment (from 1 = strongly disagree to 7 = strongly agree) with the following two items: “My business 
unit keeps close track of how well our business strategy is being carried out” and “My business unit 
regularly conducts performance reviews to determine whether we are likely to achieve our princi-
pal objectives through our business strategy.” The strategic learning and strategic control scales are 
positively and significantly correlated (r = .34, p < .01). 
Industry technological sophistication scale. Internal response consistency was assessed by computing 
the mean value of the industry technological sophistication scale among firms that indicated they 
operate in high-tech industries and among firms that indicated they operate in low tech industries. 
Among the former group of firms, the mean industry technological sophistication score is 4.59 (SD 
= 1.13). Among the latter group, the mean industry technological sophistication score is 3.26 (SD = 
1.10). These two mean scores are significantly different at the p < .001 level, indicating that the man-
agers of firms in high-tech industries perceive a much higher level of industry technological sophis-
tication than do managers of firms in low-tech industries. 
Additionally, a one-way ANOVA analysis was conducted to ascertain the validity of the industry 
technological sophistication scale relative to the American Electronics Association’s (AEA; the largest 
association of high-tech companies in the United States) proposed high-tech/low-tech industry clas-
sification system (http://www.aeanet.org/Publications/IDMK_definition.asp). Among those firms 
that would be classified as operating in high-tech industries according to the AEA, the mean industry 
technological sophistication score is 4.06 (SD = 1.21). Among those firms that would be classified as 
operating in low-tech industries according to the AEA, the mean industry technological sophistication 
score is 3.40 (SD = 1.21). These two mean scores are significantly different at the p < .05 level, provid-
ing objective support for the validity of the industry technological sophistication scale. 
Note 
1. Bedian and Mossholder (1994) and Bing et al. (2007) support the confirmatory significance of regression coef-
ficients in hypothesis testing, even when the underlying regression equation is insignificant. However, we 
acknowledge that some scholars do not accept using insignificant equations for hypothesis testing. 
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